This article was written by Angus Harker a student at the University of Warwick. This article is part of his column 'The Other Side'.
2024 has been a year of elections. We’ve had the UK General Election, a snap call that resulted in a triumphant Labour party; another snap election in France has produced a mixed result with the spectre of compromise looming overhead; Japan’s election has resulted in a “political limbo”; in Moldova, a tense presidential election and a razor-thin EU referendum has very narrowly assured a democratic alignment to the West; whilst in Georgia, a controversial election has seen pro-Russian party Georgian Dream keep their political throne; and of course, Donald Trump has resoundingly won the US presidential election, winning both the popular and electoral college vote. It’s important for these leaders to understand just what sort of arena they’re entering.
A world of populism, limbo, and election meddling to try to ensure soft power. You could be forgiven for thinking a second Cold War has arrived. Whilst Trump’s rhetoric seems to suggest an isolationist America, and his views on NATO and Ukraine weaken that simple East-West divide, evidence suggests that that Cold War comparison is more apt for trade wars instead of proxy ones - and somewhere in the Bab al-Mandab Strait is where this generation’s divided Berlin is.
Dire Straits - What is happening in the Red Sea?
On the 19th of November last year, Houthi rebels, backed by Iran, began attacking vessels in the Red Sea that were “affiliated with Israel”. Whilst this has gone under the radar in recent memory, attacks still persist, disrupting international trade - or at least, trade between countries that the Houthis deem are Israeli sympathisers. These efforts have had a marked effect on traffic through the Red Sea and Suez Canal, as information from PortWatch helpfully illuminates. Despite Western efforts, a tremendous amount of vessels have had to reroute round the Cape of Good Hope, adding 10-14 days of extra travel and roughly $1mn in extra fuel costs per trip, as well as pushing up global inflation as long as attacks continue.
Yet there is more to this than meets the eye. Firstly, it should be noted that some vessels are still using the route, prompting investigation. Work by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) has illuminated the fact that Chinese-affiliated ships have managed to continue through the lane unscathed, and hints that some of the attacks on Chinese-affiliated ships can be explained by the Houthis using outdated information regarding the vessels’ ownership. Their in-depth investigation into this topic has highlighted how rapid change of hands in vessels has led to confusion as to each tanker’s overall ownership, with continued travel through the Red Sea with previously attacked tankers raising suspicion. If they were attacked by missiles, why would they feel so comfortable going there again?
It’s important to understand the bias from WINEP, being an American-Israeli partnership institution, in writing this material. However, research does seem to align with their conclusions. It’s reported that Russia and China have reached an accord with the Houthis ensuring safe travel through the Strait, and China has suggested strengthening their identification of Chinese-owned vessels to prevent further attacks. In addition, it’s vital to understand the growing relationship between Iran and China since Trump pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, with Iran increasingly relying on China for imports and exports since sanctions were slapped on them in 2018. The evidence suggests that selling oil at discounted prices benefits China, yet it wants to keep it distant to ensure that direct confrontation is avoided with the US. However, this relationship does impose an extremely asymmetric reliance on China by Iran. Therefore, it is in their best interests that continued Chinese trade through the Red Sea is assured, which explains the Iran-backed Houthis striking a deal for safe passage.
Furthermore, investigating the vessel data of Freda, one of the attacked crude oil tankers mentioned by WINEP, does show it changed hands 5 times in the space of two months this year, and an analysis of the Andromeda Star reveals that it too changed hands recently, with ownership data obscured behind a paywall. Destination data is unavailable for the latter, but it has recently been to Hong Kong; for the Freda tanker, its destination is clear: Russia.
The unreliability and confusion around ship data links to the rise of the so-called “dark fleet” that Russia has employed to deal with its economic sanctions, utilising a “shadowy network of brass plate companies” to conduct business without Western interference. The fact that this confusion extends to China suggests a use of similar tactics; in order to skirt economic sanctions of other countries, China will go to great lengths to ensure a cheap deal and, presumably, a friendship with Iran borne out of economic necessity.
Between the Divide - the fight for East Africa
This partial blockade has a tremendous impact on geopolitics, especially when it comes to influence in Africa. Just the other side of Yemen, barely 30km past the Bab al-Mandab Strait, is East Africa, Port Sudan and the Addis-Djibouti corridor. The blockade has massively impacted these ports, which is vital for East African Nations: 90% of Sudan’s exports come through Port Sudan, and 95% of Ethiopia’s trade-by-volume flows through the Addis-Djibouti corridor. Analysing the ship attacks that occurred between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden between 2019-2024, a trend can be visible - that vessels are attacked just before they reach Djibouti, and as soon as they enter the Red Sea. Research from ACLED suggests that missiles are mostly used for the former, whilst drones are used once they pass the Strait. This differentiation suggests a commitment to longevity - drones are easier to produce - especially altering which weapons are used based on effectiveness and geography. From this, it emerges that these attacks are sustained and focused on a devotion to asymmetric warfare for the foreseeable future - and bringing East African nations to economic heel is vital for spreading political influence for the Houthis, who are already seeking to build influence in the Horn of Africa.
It goes deeper than just violence across the Strait. What of the food Africa imports? It’s noted that for some six countries - including Djibouti and Sudan - over 70% of their wheat imports come from either Ukraine or Russia. Where must they go through? The Suez Canal. In a country like Sudan, ravaged by civil war and famine, it isn’t just the leaders that have political influence. Food must be put on the table for its population - and starving a country can tank a leader’s support if a displaced family cannot feed itself. Perhaps this is one other reason why India has lifted its export ban on non-basmati white rice, and reduced its export tax on parboiled rice to ten percent. In the absence of grain, rice must do, especially from vessels not affiliated with Israel. From a crisis comes potential - and with the West being diverted from helping countries in East Africa, that presents a monopoly of opportunity.
A Fresh Light on Ukraine - A Pivotal Battleground for Control
In the wake of the US elections comes a refreshed scepticism over Ukraine. Donald Trump’s policy on the war reflects increasing uncertainty as to whether he will support Zelensky or pull out of the war altogether. For someone so focused on trade (indeed, tariff is one of his favourite words), it might be better to reframe the narrative away from good-natured interventionism, and appeal to the self-centred viewpoint in “America First”. Economy, in a crisis, shapes policy.
Ukraine, supported by America, is thus Israel-affiliated, and under threat from Houthi rebels. Most Ukrainian grain is produced in the southeast of the country, very close to where the fighting in Ukraine currently is. If the US pulls out of Ukraine, it will embolden Putin to push past a militarily weakened Ukrainian front. Putin will not stop at the Donbas and Donetsk regions - he will seek to secure as much of Ukraine as possible, not only to secure a buffer state between NATO and his country, but also to capitalise on as much of the grain production as possible. With that in mind, Ukrainian grain - now Russian - is able to be transported to East Africa through the Red Sea, which the East African nations will not hesitate to buy up to alleviate the growing food issues in their country. Russia, therefore, leverages influence over the region where the US doesn’t, through trade. The war in Europe affects Russia’s economy, and affects Africa. It is in the West’s best interest that the East does not gain a greater foothold through trade breakthroughs. Support for Ukraine, then, is vital.
An East-West divide is visible, through the ensuing issues on trade, pivoting around the Houthi blockade in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. In a time of desperate economic times, it is apparent that a desperate isolationist measure does not translate into a successful long-term vision for America or the western world. Nor does it bode well for the African nations affected the most by the blockade. It will only give agency to nations that are in contest with the West, as they are the only ones who have made steps with the Houthis to benefit from it. If chaos is a ladder, then China and Russia are halfway up the rungs.
The views and opinions expressed in this article belong solely to the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the Warwick Economics Summit
References:
Al Jazeera-
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP)
ARCGIS - Tracking Maritime Attacks in the Red Sea -
Iran Primer-
NDTV -
Lloyd’s Intelligence
Forbes
Asharq al-Awsat-
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Harvard Kennedy School) -
US Department of Agriculture
Atlantic Council
BBC News-
Sky News-
Chatham House-
Commons Library-
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data)-
World Food Programme-
Vessel Finder-
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